Many observers agree that the multilateral liberalization of service trade was a response to the intense lobbying efforts of financial service companies. In contrast, many of the firms that were affected by the General Agreement on the Trade of Services did not know where their interests lay in the multilateral negotiations and only began to work with their governments very late in the process. This paper shows that the preference evolution of service companies -both the first movers and the late comers -cannot be explained with reference to material rationality only. As a radically new trade issue, service trade was a realm of great uncertainty for business and they relied on social devices rather than pure economic calculations to determine how to position themselves on liberalization. In times of uncertainty, the differential logic of social embeddedness and the institutional constraints of a firm's national setting are therefore a more appropriate indicator for business demands than material incentives arising from the global economy.
Uncertainty is one of the most constant facts of life, and all social sciences have dedicated entire libraries to the subject. Yet treatments of what is uncertain and how and whether this uncertainty can be resolved vary widely, even if we only consider economic activity.
Uncertainty can refer to our lack of knowledge or difficulties in categorizing, the ambiguities of social settings, the risks we face or, more fundamentally, our inability to foresee the future.
Focusing on the latter, a growing body of literature in both political science and economic sociology seeks to analyze how individuals or organizations cope with uncertainty in order to engage in economic activity despite -or because of -their lack of knowledge about the future (see Abdelal/Blyth/Parsons forthcoming). Most simply put, scholars in this perspective are interested in understanding why and how political economies functions even though we only have limited capacities to estimate the probabilities of future outcomes.
When economic activity becomes routine, it is difficult to get a sense of the ever present shadow of the future and the fundamental role it plays in every day decisions. We have seen that people adjust expectations in times of crisis, but the same also happens in situations of change that are less cataclysmic (Streeck/Thelen 2005; Genieys/Smyrl 2008) .
This article shows that uncertainty about the future is crucial to understanding firm decisions about their political activities on global trade. It focuses on service trade, a new issue that emerged in the 1980s, and asks why American and European firms invested time and effort into lobbying on an issue from which they were not sure to benefit. Instead of defending monopoly rents, many service companies turned to support the multilateral liberalization of their home markets. This surprising support is difficult to explain with regards to the pay-off structure of the changed regulatory regime (Crystal 2003b) . However, once we consider the relationships firms held with potential competitors and their governments during the time in which they had to readjust their expectations about future activities, it becomes clear that their beliefs and their self-understanding crucially hinged on the ways in which they were embedded in the regulatory and political contexts.
Traditionally, studies of trade policy lobbying in International Political Economy tends to deduce interests from material consequences of liberalization or protection (Frieden 1999) . 1 This article argues that such assumptions are more appropriate for tariff negotiations in the trade of goods than for the study of new trade issues such as service trade or regulatory harmonization. For the latter, the question is no longer whether or not to liberalize trade but how to liberalize trade in a given sector. In this context, business-government relations are much more characterized by mutual learning than they are by firms exerting pressure in the pursuit of a predefined goal. However, this learning process does not happen in a vacuum, but is fundamentally constraint by the regulatory context. By comparing two classical formulations of economic activity under uncertainty -John Maynard Keynes' and Friedrich von Hayek's -the article calls attention to the importance of increasing competition in related sectors for the ways in which firms process information and prepare the future.
A first section presents the lessons from economic sociology and classic political economic thought for the analysis of business government relations on trade. A second section introduces the radical transformation of service trade during the 1980s and 1990s. The paper then analyzes how adjust their beliefs and identities over the course of transformation, which in turn contributed to the continued reform of service trade. A final section reviews the evolution of policy stances. It underlines the changes in the institutional context that led economic actors to adjust their demands, which implies that they vary across sectors and countries. The conclusion ties the findings back to the general discussion about uncertainty.
1 For a detailed discussion of this literature and existing trade policy models, see Woll (2008) .
The Inability to Foresee the Future
Economic sociology has criticized the reductionist perception of rationality employed in neo-classical economics, which tends to portray all decisions as the result of logical calculations. In order to project oneself into the future, uncertainty then becomes merely a case of risk, where probabilities can be assigned, either to the likelihood of the event or to the most likely reaction of everybody else to an event (see Knight 1921; Beckert 1996; Beckert 2003) . This neo-classical model is at the basis of materialist-rationalist political science and informs the literature's understanding of stability and social change (Blyth 2006) . In particular, it has been fundamental to theories in international political economy about business government-relations on trade (Woll 2008 values and probabilities assigned to future outcomes need to be explained with reference to the person who assigns them, not an apparently objective reality, an approach which has been labelled "economic subjectivism" (see Butos/Koppl 1997) . Keynes, who shared a Cartesian vision of knowledge as justified beliefs derived from experience and argument, insists that it is impossible to establish a list of every possible future outcome, so "our existing knowledge does not provide a sufficient basis for a calculated mathematical expectation," (Keynes 1973: p. 152) . 3 In The Sensory Order Hayek argues that 'experience' has to be categorized to be understood, but that our categories are in turn influenced by experience. This endogenous theory of knowledge, where we constantly update our mental categories and experiences, implies that all knowledge is subject to revision and therefore fallible. Individuals live "as much in a world of expectations as in a world of facts, " (Hayek 1952: 121) . Hayek (1989) therefore argued vigorously in his 1974 Nobel lecture against "the pretence of knowledge" in both politics and economics.
As a result of these divergent epistemologies, Keynes and Hayek differ in their explanations for economic action under uncertainty. For Keynes, entrepreneurs "embarked on business as a way of life," not just calculation (Keynes 1973: 150) . However, the advent of the stock market, exacerbated the instabilities created by our inability to "defeat the dark forces of time and ignorance," by separating ownership from management, which creates room to speculation (Keynes 1973: 157) . To account for the waves of optimism and pessimism observed in stock markets, Keynes notably points to the likelihood of spontaneous 2 Many other economists have done so as well, in particular G.L.S. Shackle and Ludwig Lachman, but they have arguably been less influential on the evolution of economic theory and perspectives on political economies. For a history, see (Schmidt 1996) 3 Moreover, he accuses those that espouse mathematical calculations of falling pray to "market place idols." Classic economic theory, to him, is "one of these pretty, polite techniques which tries to deal with the present by abstracting from the fact that we know very little about the future." (Keynes 1937) p. 215. and uncalculated group behaviour, which he termed "animal spirits" (Keynes 1973: 161-2) . 4 But even in all other settings, he suggests, people tends to align with the behaviour of majority, because they know that their "own judgement is worthless" and assume that maybe "the rest of the world is better informed," (Keynes 1937: 214) .
Hayek focuses much less on mass psychology, but sees economic action as a continuous process of learning. In fact, he sees knowledge not as "belief states" but as practice (Butos/Koppl 1997: 337-340 necessary for individuals to think strategically how to prevail, which leads to the emulation of those that appear to follow the winning strategies. Put differently, "it is not rationality which is required to make competition work, but competition […] which will produce rational behaviour, " (Hayek 1979: 75-76 Scholars therefore need to study the ways in which individuals relate to each other, rather than trying to predict market behavior ex ante, which cannot be known since the content of expectations depends on the web of relationships (cf. Latour 2005) .
In this article, I will show that classic trade policy predictions based on the material interests of firms fail to account for the policy stances actually observed, because they assume that interests are exogenous to the policy process. Although business-government relations were tight during the service trade negotiations, they cannot be understood as one-sided lobbying, but rather as a process of mutual learning, where firms adjust categories for thinking about themselves and their business activities over time (Crystal 2003a) . Institutional rules -and in particular the changing coverage of competition in service markets -are crucial ordering devices that help to understand the nature and timing of business objectives much better than the actual material pay-off structure of the new policy regime. Moreover, redefining categories happened in close contact with competitors and government representatives. Studying the stakes in the relational structure is thus crucial for understanding the differences in policy stances across sectors and countries. At a theoretical level, the article shows that firms are intentionally rational actors, but the content of their activities depends on their social embeddedness and evolves over time; arguably a more "constructed rationality"
than the one assumed in traditional trade policy models (Woll 2008: 7) .
In the following, the article highlights the stakes of international service trade and underlines the initial reservation that arose from the reframing of service operations as trade.
In a section about identity and ideas, it then turns to the two most important categories that were adjusted over the course of business-government relations: the firms' self-understanding and their beliefs about the nature of business government relations.
From service provision to competition
Traditionally the invisibility and temporariness of services had contributed to their neglect in trade affairs: at best they were considered a derivative of goods, at worst entirely unproductive. As part of the "tertiary sector", which included everything that was not manufacturing or agriculture, service transactions between countries showed up in national accounts under the broad label "invisibles." With shifts in economic structures, the growth of service sectors, and the increased international activities of large multinational service Making services a matter of trade between nations was a quantum leap in the ways in which government and firms thought about their activities: a "revolution in social ontology" according to Drake and Nicolaidïs (1992: 38) , who underline that "services had been Within each sectoral negotiation that ensued during the 1990s, the stakes were considerable. In the following, we will concentrate on two sectors in particular to compare the evolution of business lobbying: telecommunication services negotiated under the GATS from 1994-7 and international air transport, where liberalization was pursued bilaterally. In telecommunication services, international exchanges in telecommunication services were traditionally governed by inter-firm agreements under the technical oversight of the International Telecommunications Union (ITU) (Cowhey 1990) . Within national boundaries, the most common model of telecom provision was through a monopoly provider, often in the hands of the government, to insure the maintenance of the network and universal services to even the most remote regions (Noam 1992; Guerrieri/Scharrer 2002) . For technical standards and defence reasons, international air transport was traditionally regulated through an extensive network of bilateral agreements, which specified every aspect of business operations such as the company, the size of the fleet, the frequency of operations and the number of stops (Richards 1999) . Even after the establishment of the WTO and its dispute settlement system, companies remained sceptical of the trade system as a commercial tool. A US business representative remembers hearing that bringing a case will take about 18 months: "I started imagining explaining this to my CEO. 18 months, how many financial quarters is that?" They were following it pretty closely. I am not sure how well they followed it, but they certainly followed it closely . . . but without necessarily understanding all of the implications of what they were doing.
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European companies, by contrast, remained "remarkably uninterested in the whole process." 12 At the time, international telephony was discussed through negotiation of interconnection modalities in the ITU. For many providers, the WTO only entered the picture once it examined an issue traditionally dealt with by the ITU: accounting rates. Overall, European companies started organizing only in the mid-1990s. At that point, "there was such an empowerment of the WTO that many companies discovered its importance. carriers made to other countries continued to rise to $5.4 billion in 1995 and to $6 billion in 1996. However, the costs of these payments were born by the telephone users, not the companies. In fact, the biggest profits for U.S. carriers still came from providing international telephone services under the traditional framework, in spite of the U.S. deficit (Yoffie/Bergenstein 1985) .
A [company like] AT&T wanted to expand globally if it could win effective competitive opportunities in the domestic market of foreign countries, but it was not sure that it had an interest in changing the basic rules for providing international telephone services between countries (Cowhey/Richards 2000: 156) .
What then explains the broad support of the telecom companies for the WTO liberalization project? To some degree, their mobilization has to be understood as an attempt to jump on a train that had visibly started moving. User groups and financial service companies had advanced the issue of service trade liberalization to a point where telecom companies started perceiving it as inevitable. Other companies joined despite the fact that they were not sure about the benefits of free service trade.
A lot of companies were skeptical. They were wondering what we were doing, thinking that there were some ulterior motives behind our plans. . . . But they joined us because they wanted to take part in a process they were afraid of at least to control where it was going.
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Embracing trade as the new frame of reference happened because telecom companies realized that if they were not prepared to participate in the reshaping of their regulatory framework, the world would move on without them. Similar anticipative behavior might even explain why internationalization became a major theme for telecom companies in both the United States and Europe through the 1990s. Even though "they did not earn their largest profit margins by executing global strategies, . . . big phone companies believed that user needs would force them to go global, " (Cowhey/Richards 2000: 156) . In essence, the real driving forces behind liberalization were governments and user firms. Telecom companies eventually ended up supporting the new design with the same enthusiasm, essentially because they felt that they needed to seize these new opportunties in order to gain a competitive advantage in the future global market.
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It happened during the time of the internet bubble. New markets were potential jackpots. All analysts were advising to go into it. Billions were invested into nothing.
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The reframing of international telecom operations as trade and no longer as interconnection and the joint provision of services had happened as a result of businessgovernment and business-business interactions, where ideas about the relationship between operations and future profits were communicated and diffused. itself as very beneficial to the carriers involved, and the Amsterdam and Detroit/Minneapolis hub became a model for other carriers.
They had this huge demand, beyond the people that were flying from Detroit to Amsterdam, because people then connected. It was extraordinary: the carriers were making a lot of money and providing a good service. So other carriers said: "We have got to go do this!"
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Carriers which had initially opposed the KLM/Northwest alliance because they did not have the same opportunity realized that there was no use resisting this development:
We had to change our thinking. We had to realize that it does not matter that there is a very precise exchange as long as we can create this environment where we are allowed to create global entities in strategic positions.
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The obvious success of the early alliances set off "a race for everybody to find a suitable alliance partner," explains the airline representative. The maxim of these years was: 
Identities: from national champions to global players
A more fundamental transformation behind the new policy demands was the changing self-conception of the firms. Some firms, such as financial service providers, long distance telecom companies, or US airlines were competitive service providers from the beginning. A study of European and American monopolists reveals, however, that variation between companies depended on the degree to which they embraced their new corporate identity or insisted on their often public incumbent status. Francisco to New York. While all major carriers opposed the proposition, JetBlue Airways, which would be most affected because it derives about one-third of its revenue from flying coast-to-coast, supported the initiative. 27 Like MCI in the telecom sector, the low-cost carriers consider themselves defenders of competition and do not lobby for market barriers, even though they face the strongest economic incentives to do so.
The evolution of policy stances from a sociological perspective
In both sectors and regions, the evolution of firms' policy stances and political The key turning points in the evolution of the political mobilization of service companies were therefore regional and sectoral changes in the regulatory frameworks and political opportunities, which explains why lobbying varied along these lines to a much greater degree than investment or revenue from international operations would suggest (Woll 2008: 56-61; Crystal 2003b ).
In telecommunications, international service providers were the first to turn to support of a multilateral agreement, when they realized that user groups and the lobbying of financial service companies had set in motion a process that would continue with or without them.
Regional network operators, by contrast, did not seize this political opportunity immediately.
It was only in the preparation for the U.S. Telecom Act of 1996 that they realized that they would need to function as a competitive company. For observers, the new law was more extensive than the divestiture of AT&T in 1984: it "was the industry equivalent of the Berlin Wall being broken down." 28 The struggle over re-regulation that regional bell operators carried from the Telecom Act negotiations to the WTO through the formulation of a reference paper attached to the final Basic Telecom Agreement testifies to the deep ambivalence the network operators had in their policy stance on multilateral liberalization. This ambivalence was shared by European operators, which also only mobilized multilaterally once the internal liberalization had become certain. As a member of the WTO working group of the European Telecommunication Network Operators' Association underlines:
The date: 1 January 1998! That's when we knew liberalization would really happen. When we knew what would come, it became possible to promote a common platform concerning our goals for the international liberalization of telecommunications.
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The anticipation of political developments and the exposure to competition in local and regional settings changed how telecommunication companies anticipated the future.
Although they could have still insisted on protection at the multilateral level, they preferred to concentrate on the opportunities of foreign market access to enable new expansionist business strategies.
In that this meant losing the privileged relationships that they had enjoyed at the domestic level.
New political opportunities and institutional change are thus crucial for understanding the evolution of policy stances of service firms: above all, changing competition rules, even if they do not apply directly to the political jurisdiction that negotiations actually center on.
Conclusion
To summarize, across sectors and countries, the sequence of policy stances of service firms is comparable. When faced with new stakes, firms are initially confused and need to learn about their nature and functioning. During this phase, they mobilize little, but watch their competitors and interact with government representatives to acquire information and signals about the most likely consequences and the most adequate strategies. During a second phase, they need to decide on a plan of action. Some mobilize, either because they can identify clear benefits or because they are afraid to be left behind. Others prefer to adopt a more conservative perspective and remain silent or lobby against the policy proposal. During this phase, a crucial change happened in all of our cases at different moments in time, which explains why we observe such a great convergence and wide-spread support for multilateral liberalization: the introduction of competition in their local markets. This event precluded conservative protectionist strategies and pushed firms to engage on multilateral negotiations in order to contribute to defining its content. Firms did not just convert to an ideological support for market liberalization, but accepted that competition was going to be part of their daily routine, which meant that they needed to devise strategies for succeeding beyond their traditional markets as well.
Ironically, it is because firms anticipated competition and positioned themselves in general terms supportive towards negotiations at the multilateral levels that governments were able to negotiate agreements against the opposition of more conservative forces, such as hesitant member states in the EU or Congress in the U.S.. Within the political game, the fact that even the firms that would be affected by international competition spoke out in favour of it gave an important political momentum to the reformers. To simplify somewhat, multilateral trade in service became a reality, because firms widely supported it, but many of the firms supported it, because they had accepted that it was to become a reality. In essence, one could argue that this is a political performance effect of lobbying, comparable to the performance effects of mathematical models used for predicting the economy (MacKenzie 2006).
The question of uncertainty is evident in context where institutional rules become fundamentally redefined. We do observe some uncalculated mass behaviour, as Keynes has suggested, but pure emulation can only tell us a small part of the story. The majority of firms were continuously trying to figure out where their interests lay, they calculated the potential benefits and tried to act in pursuit of them. Only, the benefits were anticipated and difficult to estimate, because firms faced many unknowns and had no comparisons with past experiences.
The evolution of policy stances over time indicates that firms constantly updated the way they thought about their international activities and themselves and categorized new facts and experiences accordingly. This corresponds to Hayek's understanding of knowledge as practice, which is crucially shaped by institutional orders such as competition. Moreover, since they knew the importance of new institutional orders, firms became active to contribute to shaping the regulatory details the different agreements would contain. Indeed, Neil Fligstein (2002) has underlined that the interaction between firms and governments is crucial for market-making, and in particular for the shaping of control mechanisms, which are necessary to stabilize markets and therefore contribute to firm survival. In the end, many of the sometimes surprising political activities happened because firms wanted to contribute to the reduction of uncertainty, if only for a limited period of time.
